We prove a Tauberian theorem for nonexpansive operators, and apply it to the model of zero-sum stochastic game. Under mild assumptions, we prove that the value of the λ-discounted game v λ converges uniformly when λ goes to 0 if and only if the value of the n-stage game v n converges uniformly when n goes to infinity. This generalizes the Tauberian theorem of Lehrer and Sorin [6] to the two-player zero-sum case. We also provide the first example of a stochastic game with public signals on the state and perfect observation of actions, with finite state space, signal sets and action sets, in which for some initial state k 1 known by both players, (v λ (k 1 )) and (v n (k 1 )) converge to distinct limits.
Introduction
Zero-sum stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [23] . In this model, two players repeatedly play a zero-sum game, which depends on the state of nature. At each stage, a new state of nature is drawn from a distribution based on the actions of players and the state of the previous stage. The state of nature is announced to both players, along with the actions of the previous stage. There are several ways to evaluate the payoff in a stochastic game. For n ∈ N * , the payoff in the n − stage game is the Cesaro mean n −1 n m=1 g m , where g m is the payoff at stage m ≥ 1. For λ ∈ (0, 1], the payoff in the λ − discounted game is the Abel mean m≥1 λ(1 − λ) m−1 g m . Under mild assumptions, the n-stage game and the λ-discounted game have a value, denoted respectively by v n and v λ (see Maitra and Parthasarathy [8] and Nowak [13] ).
A huge part of the literature focuses on the existence of the limit of v n when n goes to infinity, and of the limit of v λ when λ goes to 0. Bewley and Kohlberg [1] proved that (v n ) and (v λ ) converge to the same limit, when the state space and action sets are finite. For Markov Decision Processes, this result extends to the case of compact state space, infinite action set and 1-Lipschitz transition (see Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [20] and Renault [16] ). For absorbing games, this result extends to the case of infinite state space, compact action sets and continuous payoff and transition functions (see Mertens, Neyman and Rosenberg [9] ). Vigeral [26] provided an example of a stochastic game with finite state space and compact action sets in which neither (v n ) nor (v λ ) converges. A natural question is whether the convergence of (v n ) implies the convergence of (v λ ), and conversely. When (v λ ) is absolutely continuous with respect to λ, Neyman [24, Appendix C, p.177] proved that (v n ) converges to the limit of (v λ ). In the dynamic programming framework, Lehrer and Sorin [6] proved that (v n ) converges uniformly (with respect to the initial state) if and only if (v λ ) converges uniformly, and that when uniform convergence holds, the two limits coincide * . This result does not hold when uniform convergence is replaced by pointwise convergence (see Sorin [24, Chapter 1, ). In the two-player case, Li and Venel [7] proved that for recursive
Nonexpansive operators
Let (X, . ) be a Banach space, and Ψ : X → X be a nonexpansive mapping, that is:
By a standard fixed point argument (see Sorin [24, Appendix C]), there exists a bounded family (v λ ) λ∈(0,1] such that for all λ ∈ (0, 1]
For n ∈ N * , define
where Ψ n is the n-th iterate of Ψ. Because Ψ is nonexpansive, (v n ) n≥1 is bounded. Kohlberg and Neyman [5] provided conditions under which lim n→+∞ v n and lim λ→0 v λ exist. In this section, we investigate the link between the existence of lim n→+∞ v n and lim λ→0 v λ . We make the following assumption:
Remark 1.
1. An important class of operators which satisfy Assumption 1 is the following. Let K be any set, and X be the set of bounded real-valued functions defined on K, equipped with the uniform norm. Consider two sets S and T , and a family of linear forms (P k,s,t ) (k,s,t)∈K×S×T on X, such that for all (k, s, t), P k,s,t is of norm smaller than 1. Let g : K × S × T → R be a bounded function. Define Ψ : X → X by Ψ(f )(k) := sup s∈S inf t∈T {g(k, s, t) + P k,s,t (f )}, for all f ∈ X and k ∈ K. This class includes Shapley operators (see Neyman [12, p.397-415] ): this corresponds to the case where K is the state space of some zero-sum stochastic game, S (resp. T ) is the set of mixed actions of Player 1 (resp. 2), k is the current state, and P k,s,t (f ) is the expectation of f (k ′ ) under mixed actions s and t, where k ′ is the state at next stage. Under suitable assumptions, for all n ∈ N * and λ ∈ (0, 1], v n and v λ are respectively the value of the n-stage game and the value of the λ-discounted game. This point will be useful in Sections 2 and 3.
We now state a Tauberian theorem for nonexpansive operators satisfying Assumption 1.
Theorem 1.2. Under Assumption 1, the two following statements are equivalent:
(a) The sequence (v n ) n≥1 converges when n goes to infinity.
(b) The mapping λ → v λ has a limit when λ goes to 0.
Moreover, when these statements hold, we have lim n→+∞ v n = lim λ→0 v λ .
The remainder of this section is dedicated to the proof of the theorem. Definition 1.3. Let λ ∈ (0, 1] and n ∈ N * . The operator Ψ n λ : X → X is defined recursively by Ψ 0 λ (f ) := f for all f ∈ X, and for n ≥ 1:
Note that equation (1.1) writes
, n ∈ N * and t ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Then
Proof. Proof (i) This follows from the nonexpansiveness of Ψ.
(ii) We have
The first inequality stems from the nonexpansiveness of Ψ. In the second inequality, we applied Assumption 1 for
n −1 (f ), and used the nonexpansiveness of Ψ. Applying successively Assumption 1 for
.., t}) together with the nonexpansiveness of Ψ yields the third inequality.
We now prove that (a) implies (b).
In the first inequality, we applied Assumption 1 to f = (1 − λ)v λ , and in the second inequality, we applied twice the nonexpansiveness of Ψ. We deduce the existence of A > 0 such that for all
Consequently, in order to prove (b), it is sufficient to prove that (v n −1 ) n≥1 converges when n goes to infinity.
Let n ≥ ǫ −2 N 0 , λ := n −1 , and t := ⌊ǫn⌋, where ⌊x⌋ denotes the integer part of x. Equations (1.1) and (1.2) yield
and
We have
Applying first (1.4) and Lemma 1.4 (i), then (1.3), we obtain
Let M := C + sup n∈N v n . Equality (1.5) and Lemma 1.4 (ii) yield
The last two inequalities yield
We deduce that
The right-hand side goes to 0 when ǫ goes to 0, thus (b) holds.
Assume (b). There exists β ∈ (0, 1) such that for all λ ∈ (0, β], we have
and λ r := 1/n r . The following assertions hold:
(ii) Let r ∈ {1, ..., r 0 − 1}. We have
(iii) It is a direct consequence of (1.6) and (i).
Let r ∈ {1, ..., r 0 − 1}. Equations (1.1) and (1.2) yield
Applying first (1.7) and then Lemma 1.5 (iii) yields
Summing from r = 1 to r = r 0 − 1 yields
The right-hand side goes to 0 as ǫ goes to 0, thus (a) holds. Note that the proof of the two implications show that when (a) and (b) hold, we have lim n→+∞ v n = lim λ→0 v λ .
Applications to zero-sum stochastic games
In this section, we apply Theorem 1.2 to zero-sum stochastic games.
Dynamic programming
A dynamic programming problem is described by a state space K, a nonvoid correspondence F : K ⇒ K, and a bounded payoff function g : K → R.
The problem proceeds as follows. Given an initial state k 1 ∈ K, at each stage, the decisionmaker chooses k m+1 ∈ F (k m ), and gets the stage payoff g(k m ). For λ ∈ (0, 1] (resp. n ∈ N * ) in the λ-discounted problem (resp. n-stage problem), the decision-maker maximizes the total payoff
. A strategy for the decision-maker assigns a decision k m+1 ∈ F (k m ) to each finite history (k 1 , k 2 , ..., k m ). We denote respectively v λ (k 1 ) and v n (k 1 ) the value of the λ-discounted problem and n-stage problem:
, where S is the set of strategies.
Let X be the set of bounded real-valued functions defined on K, equipped with the uniform norm.
X is a Banach space and Ψ is a nonexpansive operator which satisfies Assumption 1. Standard dynamic programming gives (see Lehrer and Sorin [6] ):
Applying Theorem 1.2, we recover the Tauberian theorem proved in Lehrer and Sorin [6] : (v n ) converges uniformly on K if and only if (v λ ) converges uniformly on K, and when uniform convergence holds, the two limits coincide.
Zero-sum stochastic games
If (C, C ) is a Borel subset of a Polish space, we denote by ∆(C) the set of probability measures on C, equipped with the weak * topology.
We use the same framework as in Maitra and Parthasarathy [8] . We consider a general model of zero-sum stochastic game, described by a state space K which is a Borel subset of a Polish space, two action sets I and J, which are Borel subsets of a Polish space, a Borel measurable transition function q : K × I × J → ∆(K), and a bounded Borel measurable payoff function g :
The initial state is k 1 ∈ K, and the stochastic game Γ(k 1 ) which starts in k 1 proceeds as follows. At each stage m ≥ 1, both players choose simultaneously and independently an action, i m ∈ I (resp. j m ∈ J) for Player 1 (resp. 2). The payoff at stage m is g m := g(k m , i m , j m ). The state k m+1 of stage m + 1 is drawn from the probability distribution q(k m , i m , j m ). Then (k m+1 , i m , j m ) is publicly announced to both players. The set of all possible histories before stage m is H m := (K ×I ×J) m−1 ×K. A behavioral strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) is a Borel measurable mapping σ :
is the game defined by its normal form (Σ, T , γ
Let n ∈ N * . The n-stage game Γ n (k 1 ) is the game defined by its normal form (Σ, T , γ k 1 n ), where
Let f : K → R be a bounded Borel measurable function, and (
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. For all k 1 ∈ K, λ ∈ (0, 1] and n ∈ N * , the games Γ λ (k 1 ) and Γ n (k 1 ) have a value, that is, there exists real numbers v λ (k 1 ) and v n (k 1 ) such that:
Moreover, v λ and v n are Borel measurable, and satisfy the following Shapley equations:
Let X be the set of bounded Borel measurable functions from K to R, equipped with the uniform norm, and for all (f, k) ∈ X × K, we define Ψ(f )(k) := sup x∈∆(I) inf y∈∆(J) g(k, x, y) + E k x,y (f ) . We make the following assumption:
Remark 2.1. When K, I and J are compact metric spaces and q and g are jointly continuous, Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Maitra and Parthasarathy [8] and Nowak [13] provided weaker conditions under which Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Moreover, when these statements hold, we have lim n→+∞ v n = lim λ→0 v λ .
Proof. Proof X is a Banach space, and Assumption 3 ensures that Ψ is well defined from X to X. Moreover, Ψ is a nonexpansive operator which satisfies Assumption 1. Thus Theorem 1.2 applies to Ψ. By Assumption 2, the families of values (v λ ) and (v n ) satisfy equations (1.1) and (1.2), and the result is proved.
Stochastic games with signals
Assume K, I and J to be finite. The previous model can be generalized in the following way. Let A (resp. B) be a finite set of signals for Player 1 (resp. 2). Instead of observing the past actions (i m , j m ) and the future state k m+1 at the end of each stage m, Player 1 (resp. 2) gets a private signal a m (resp. b m ), which is correlated to (k m , i m , j m ) (see Mertens, Sorin and Zamir [10, Chapter IV] for more details). This defines a stochastic game with signals, denoted by Γ. A behavioral strategy for a player assigns a mixed action to each of his private history (that is, all the actions he has played and all the signals he has received before the current stage). Because K, I, J, A and B are finite, the λ-discounted game and the n-stage game have a value for all λ ∈ (0, 1] and n ∈ N * . By Mertens, Sorin and Zamir [10, Chapter III], there exists a stochastic game Γ (in the sense of the previous subsection) with perfect observation of the state and actions, which is equivalent to Γ: it has the same λ-discounted and n-stage values. The state space of this auxiliary stochastic game is the set of infinite higher-order beliefs of the players about the state: this is the universal belief space, denoted by B. The set B is compact metric, and Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. Thus Theorem 2.2 applies to the auxiliary stochastic game Γ. 
Examples of zero-sum stochastic games
We apply the results of the previous section to several standard examples of zero-sum stochastic games.
Stochastic games with compact action sets and finite state space
We consider the case where the state space is finite, the action sets are compact, and the transition and payoff functions are separately continuous. By the standard minmax theorem, Assumptions 2 and 3 hold (it is a particular case of Maitra and Parthasarathy [8] ). Because K is finite, uniform convergence and pointwise convergence with respect to the state variable are equivalent. Theorem 2.2 yields the following proposition: Proposition 3.1. In a stochastic game with finite state space and compact action sets, the two following statements are equivalent:
(a) For all k 1 ∈ K, (v n (k 1 )) converges when n goes to infinity.
(b) For all k 1 ∈ K, (v λ (k 1 )) converges when λ goes to 0.
Moreover, when these statements hold, we have lim n→+∞ v n (k 1 ) = lim λ→0 v λ (k 1 ) for all k 1 ∈ K.
Hidden stochastic games
Consider the following example of stochastic game with signals. Assume that K, I and J are finite, and that players do not observe the current state at each stage (they observe past actions). Instead, they receive a public signal about it, lying in some finite set A (see Renault and Ziliotto [18] for more details). In this particular case, the universal belief space is B = ∆(K): this corresponds to the common belief of the players about the state (see Ziliotto [27] ). Thus, (v λ ) and (v n ) can be considered as families of maps from ∆(K) to R. They are both equi-Lipschitz, thus for theses families, pointwise convergence and uniform convergence are equivalent. By Proposition 2.3, the following result holds. Proposition 3.2. In a hidden stochastic game, the two following statements are equivalent:
(a) For all p 1 ∈ ∆(K), (v n (p 1 )) converges when n goes to infinity.
(b) For all p 1 ∈ ∆(K), (v λ (p 1 )) converges when λ goes to 0.
Moreover, when these statements hold, we have lim n→+∞ v n (p 1 ) = lim λ→0 v λ (p 1 ) for all p 1 ∈ ∆(K).
Markov chain games with incomplete information on both sides
Consider the following example of stochastic game with signals. Assume that K, I and J are finite, and that the state space is a product K = C × D, such that the two components of the state follow independent Markov chains. Players know the transition and the initial distribution of each Markov chain, but only Player 1 (resp. 2) observes the realization at stage 1 of the first (resp. second) component. From stage 2, they do not observe the state. They observe past actions (see Gensbittel and Renault [3] for more details). In this particular case, the equivalent stochastic game with perfect observation of the state has state space ∆(C) × ∆(D), that is, the product of the set of possible beliefs of Player 2 about the initial state of the first Markov chain, and of the set of possible beliefs of Player 1 about the initial state of the second Markov chain. Thus, (v λ ) and (v n ) can be considered as families of maps from ∆(C) × ∆(D) to R. They are both equi-Lipschitz, thus for these families, pointwise convergence and uniform convergence are equivalent. Gensbittel and Renault [3] proved that (v n ) converges, and asked whether (v λ ) converges. By Remark 2.1, Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, and from Theorem 2.2 we deduce the following result: Proposition 3.3. In a Markov chain game with incomplete information on both sides, for all p 1 ∈ ∆(C) × ∆(D), (v n (p 1 )) and (v λ (p 1 )) converge to the same limit.
An example
In this section, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. There exists a hidden stochastic game such that for some initial state k 1 ∈ K known by both players, (v λ (k 1 )) and (v n (k 1 )) converge to distinct limits. Remark 4.2. As proved in Ziliotto [27, Section 4, p. 21], this hidden stochastic game can be adapted, in order to get an example of a stochastic game with compact action sets and finite state space, such that for some initial state k 1 ∈ K, (v λ (k 1 )) and (v n (k 1 )) converge to distinct limits. It is also possible to build an example of a hidden stochastic game such that for some initial state k 1 ∈ K known by both players, (v λ (k 1 )) converges but (v n (k 1 )) does not, and conversely, an example where (v n (k 1 )) converges but (v λ (k 1 )) does not.
Before going to the proof, we provide some piece of intuition. In Ziliotto [27] , a hidden stochastic game Γ is constructed, in which neither (v λ (k 1 )) nor (v n (k 1 )) converges, where k 1 is an initial state known by both players. In the discounted game, there exists optimal stationary strategies (that is, strategies which only depend on the common belief about the current state). In this example, a stationary strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) is equivalent to the choice of an integer a ∈ rN (resp. b ∈ 2rN). Apart from the fact that Player 2's set of stationary strategies is smaller, the game is symmetric. In Γ λ (k 1 ), the optimal choice for both players is to choose m as close as possible to − ln( √ 2λ)/ ln(2). For some λ, the closest integer lies in r(2N + 1), and Player 1 has an advantage, whereas for some other discount factors, it lies in 2rN, and Player 1 has no advantage. This is why (v λ (k 1 )) oscillates (between 1/2 and some l ∈ (1/2, 1]). In Γ n (k 1 ), there may not exist optimal stationary strategies. Depending on the stage of the game m ∈ {1, ...n}, the optimal integer for Player 1 lies in 2rN, or in r (2N + 1) . Thus, according to the stage of the game, Player 1 may or may not have an advantage. This is in sharp contrast to the discounted game Γ λ (k 1 ), in which either Player 1 always has an advantage at any stage of the game, or it never has one. That is why we believe that in this example, lim inf n→+∞ v n (k 1 ) > 1/2 (but we were not able to prove it). Nonetheless, one can construct a hidden stochastic game Γ 1 , very similar to Γ, in which lim inf n→+∞ v 1 n (k 1 ) > 1/2 (this corresponds to Step 1 of the proof). In Step 2, we construct a hidden stochastic game Γ 2 , which only difference with Γ 1 is that Player 2's set of stationary strategies is equivalent to r(2N + 1), instead of 2rN. In Γ 2 , we also have lim inf n→+∞ v 2 n (k 2 ) > 1/2, where k 2 is an initial state known by both players. In Step 3, we define the hidden stochastic game Γ 3 , in which starting from an initial state ω 3 , Player 2 chooses between playing
Player 1 does not have an advantage, because the optimal integer is the same at any stage of the game (either it always lies in 2rN, or it always lies in r (2N + 1) ). Thus, lim λ→0 v 3 λ (ω 3 ) = 1/2, but lim inf n→+∞ v 3 n (ω 3 ) > 1/2. It is then straightforward to construct in Step 4 a final example Γ 4 which proves the theorem.
Step 1 The game Γ 1 .
In Ziliotto [27, Section 3, , for some r ≥ 2, a hidden stochastic game Γ with 3r + 4 states, two signals {D, D ′ } and two actions {C, Q} for each player is constructed, such that for some initial state k 1 = 1 ++ ∈ K known by both players, and for all λ ∈ (0, 1], the following properties hold:
(1) The game Γ λ (k 1 ) (that is, the λ-discounted game starting from state k 1 , and players know the initial state) has the same value as the one-shot game G λ , with action set rN for Player 1, 2rN for Player 2, and payoff function
where
(4) Consider the one-shot game with action set rN for Player 1 and 2, and payoff function g λ . The value of this game converges to 1/2 when λ goes to 0.
Property ( (1)) corresponds to [27, Proposition 3.3, p. 15] . Property ( (3)) follows from the proof of [27, Theorem 3.6, . In G λ , a dominant strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) is to maximize f λ over rN (resp. 2rN). Consequently, if the action set of Player 2 is changed into rN, the value of this new game is equal to [1 + max a∈rN f λ (a)] −1 . This quantity is greater than 1/2, thus Property ((2)) holds. By [27, Lemma 2.4, p. 10], this quantity goes to 1/2 as λ goes to 0, thus Property ((4)) holds. Define another hidden stochastic game Γ 1 , by adding a new state ω 1 to Γ (the action and signal sets are unchanged). The game is described by the following figure:
The payoff in state ω 1 is 1/2, and Player 1 controls ω 1 (that is, the transition in ω 1 is independent of Player 2's actions). When Player 1 plays action C in state ω 1 , the game remains in state ω 1 with probability 1, and when Player 1 plays action Q, the game goes to state k 1 with probability 1, and the game Γ(k 1 ) is played.
We have the following proposition:
(i) The game Γ 1 λ (ω 1 ) has the same value as the one-shot game G 1 λ , with action set rN for Player 1, 2rN for Player 2, and payoff function g 1 λ (a,
Proof.
(i) It follows from ( (2)) that an optimal strategy for Player 1 in Γ 1 λ (ω 1 ) is to play Q at stage 1, then an optimal strategy in Γ λ (k 1 ), which proves the result.
(ii) Let ǫ > 0. By ( (3)), there exists m 0 ∈ N * such that for all m ≥ m 0 , v nm (k 1 ) ≥ 2/3. Let n ≥ n m 0 , and let m ≥ m 0 such that n m ≤ n ≤ n m+1 . Define the following strategy for Player 1 in Γ 1 n (ω 1 ): play C (thus stay in ω 1 ) until stage n − n m , play Q at stage n − n m , then from stage n − n m + 1, play an optimal strategy in Γ nm (k 1 ). This strategy guarantees 1 n
Step 2 The game Γ 2 .
One can construct a hidden stochastic game Γ similar to the example in [27, Section 3, , with 3r + 4 states, two signals {D, D ′ } and two actions {C, Q} for each player, such that for some initial state k 1 ∈ K known by both players, the following properties hold:
(1) The game Γ λ (k 1 ) has the same value as the one-shot game G λ , with action set rN for Player 1, r(2N + 1) for Player 2, and payoff function g λ defined by equation (4.1). Using the same construction as in the previous step, adding one more state ω 2 to Γ, we obtain a hidden stochastic game Γ 2 which satisfies the equivalent of Proposition 4.3:
Proposition 4.4.
(i) The game Γ 2 λ (ω 2 ) has the same value as the one-shot game G 2 λ , with action set rN for Player 1, r(2N + 1) for Player 2, and payoff function g 2 λ (a, b) := λ/2 + (1 − λ)g λ (a, b).
(ii) The sequence of values (v 2 n ) of Γ 2 n satisfies lim inf n→+∞ v 2 n (ω 2 ) > 1/2.
Step 3 The game Γ 3 .
Denote K 1 (resp. K 2 ) the state space of Γ 1 (resp. Γ 2 ), and define the hidden stochastic game with state space K := K 1 ∪ K 2 ∪ {ω 3 }, action sets I := J := {C, Q}, signal set A := {D, D ′ }. The game is described by the following figure: (i) The game Γ 3 λ (ω 3 ) has the same value as the one-shot game G λ , with action set rN for Player 1 and Player 2, and payoff function g λ := λ(2 − λ)/2 + (1 − λ) 2 g λ , where g λ is described by equation (4.1). In particular, (v λ (ω 3 )) converges to 1/2. Proof.
(i) The first point follows from Proposition 4.3 (i) and Proposition 4.4 (i), and the second point is a consequence of Property ((4)) in Step 1.
(ii) This is a consequence of Proposition 4.3 (ii) and Proposition 4.4 (ii).
Step 4 Final example and proof of the theorem.
Let x such that 1/2 < x < lim inf n→+∞ v 3 n (ω 3 ). Define a hidden stochastic game Γ 4 by adding two more state ω 4 and x * to Γ 3 , as described in the following figure: 
